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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Discovery, with a Department of Defense (DoD) payload, was successfully
launched on November 22, 1989, at 7:23 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) from
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. This was the first post-Challenger night launch.
The Solid Rocket Booster separation could be clearly seen nearly 30 miles over the
Atlantic, and the bright pinpoints of light from the Orbiter's main engines were visible
by long-range tracking cameras almost to the time of engine cutoff.
The landing was delayed one day because of strong wind gusts across the dry
lakebed runway at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California. The next day,
Discovery's deorbit burn was again bumped back, by 90 minutes, to allow the winds to
subside to within acceptable limits. The engines were then fired to begin the 1-hour
20-minute deorbit to Earth; this was longer than usual due to the high orbital altitude
on this flight. Because the crosswinds on the lakebed were still beyond acceptable
limits, even though the strong gusts had subsided, Discovery was ordered en route to use




The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSB) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and the Space Shuttle
Program Director prior to each Space Shuttle flight. The intent of the MSE is to
document safety risk factors that represent a change, or potential change, to the risk
baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) in the Space Shuttle
Hazard Reports. Unresolved safety risk factors impacting STS-33 flight were also
documented prior to the STS-33 Flight Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and
prior to the STS-33 Launch Minus Two Day (L-2) Review (L-2 Edition). This final
postflight edition evaluates performance against safety risk factors identified in previous
MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
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The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and the Space
Shuttle Program Director with the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on
changes, or potential changes, to the Program safety risk baseline approved in the
formal Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard
Analysis process. While some changes to the baseline since the previous flight are
included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to
ensure that changes which were too late to include in formal changes through the
FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position,
which includes the acceptance rationale.
12 Scope
This report addresses STS-33 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and
factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect or have the
potential to affect Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for
discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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L3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 - Provides a brief mission description, including launch data,
crew size, mission duration, launch and landing sites, and other
mission-related information.
Section 3 - Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-33 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-33
flight.
Section 4 - Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-33.
Section 5 - Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-34 mission.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-29
mission.
Section 7 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-33
mission. Those STS-33 IFAs which are considered to represent
safety risks will be addressed in the MSE for the next Space
Shuttle flight.
Section 8 - Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-33 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of STS-33 Mission.
Space Shuttle Discovery, with a Department of Defence (DoD) payload, was
successfully launched at 7:23 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on November 22, 1989,
from Pad 39B at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). STS-33 was the first post-Challenger
night launch. The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) separation could be clearly seen over
the Atlantic, and the bright pinpoints of light from Discovery's main engines were visible
to the naked eye nearly 600 miles down range and almost to Main Engine Cutoff
(MECO) by long-range tracking cameras.
Ascent performance was nominal. Anomalies reported on STS-33 were the least
of any post-Challenger era flights. Of the Orbiter anomalies reported, a cabin pressure
leak through the Waste Collection System (WCS) was the most critical. A Gaseous
Nitrogen (GNZ) leak in Water Spray Boiler (WSB) #1 and high temperature oscillations
in Flash Evaporator System (FES) "B" were anomalies experienced on previous Discovery
missions.
The STS-33 launch film showed stud hang-up at Holddown Post (HDP) #3 similar
to that experienced during the STS-34 launch. Broaching and loss of epon shim material
were also experienced at HDP #3. Thread impressions were visible on the forward side
of the same hole. One of the two pyrotechnic charges used on each frangible nut did
not appear to explode properly, as indicated by ductile separation of the frangible nut.
The potential, problem experienced with skewed firing of the frangible nut pyrotechnic
charge identified the need for further analysis relative to the influence and contribution
of bolt hang-up and liftoff performance degradation. Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) and Rockwell International (RI) analyses indicate that all 8 HDP bolts could
hang-up with no deleterious liftoff performance effects, provided that all frangible nuts
are released.
Postflight inspection of STS-33 SRBs found connectors that were improperly
torqued and lockwired. These anomalies resulted in no adverse or safety-of-flight
conditions.
Corrective procedures and awareness training are now in place at KSC to correct
problems with connector/fastener installations.
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Postflight inspection of Discovery's main engines revealed two anomalous
conditions. First, inspection at Dryden revealed damage to the engine heat shield
blankets. Engines #2011 and #2107 sustained typical flight damage, with torn blankets
and some pillow damage. Engine #2031 damage was considered unique in that the 1"
bumper strip that attaches the heat shield blanket broke loose. The detached blanket
dropped down on top of the nozzle. The flexible seal beneath the blanket was exposed;
however, further inspection revealed that the seal was only slightly discolored and that it
was still flexible. Postflight inspection of engine #2107 also found that the nozzle was
discolored, or "blued", on the front face of the aft manifold. Discoloration in this
uninsulated nozzle region has not been experienced on previous flights. No
discoloration was seen on engine #2031 nozzle. It was also noted that this was a new
nozzle, which had never flown.
There were no Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) and no External Tank (ET) anomalies
reported on STS-33.
The landing was delayed one day because of strong wind gusts across the dry
lakebed runway at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB), California. The next day,
November 27, 1989, Discovery's deorbit burn was again delayed, by one orbit, to allow
the winds to subside to within acceptable limits. Reaction Control System (RCS)
thrusters and engines were fired to begin the 1-hour 20-minute deorbit to Earth.
Because the crosswinds on the lakebed runway were still beyond acceptable limits,
Discovery was ordered en route to land on a concrete runway at EAFB. Landing
occurred at 7:31 p.m. EST, after 77 orbits.
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Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: November 22, 1989
• Launch Time: 7:23 p.m. EST
Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 33
• TAL Site: Ben Guerir
• Alternate TAL Site: None
• Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Concrete Runway
• Landing Date: November 27, 1989
• Landing Time: 7:31 p.m. EST
• Mission Duration: 5 Days, 8 Minutes
"••'• v«




• Orbiter: OV-103 (9) Discovery
SSMEs: (1) #2011, (2) #2031, (3) #2107
ET: ET-038
SRBs: BI-034
SRMs: RSRM Flight Set #7









































* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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22 Payload Data
The payload was classified.
Headquarters NASA Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance did
not participate in the Safety Reviews for the DoD payloads. NASA Headquarters Safety
Division, Code QS, did participate in review of the Integrated Cargo Hazard Report
(ICHR) by the System Safety Review Panel (SSRP).
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-33 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-33 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-33 flight. The list indicates the
section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSB) Report in which the item is addressed,
the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description of the item,
and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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ITEM
Section 4; Resolved Safety Risk Factors
Orbiter 2 OV-104 Star Tracker Door
stalled during closure.
Section 5; STS-34 Inflight Anomalies
Orbiter 8 Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) #2 fuel pump
neater "B" cycling high.
COMMENT
The Y-Star Tracker Door thermal
blanket was found totally detached from
the door and lying loose on the bottom
of the Star Tracker cavity during
STS-33/OV-103 postflight inspection
(IFA No. STS-33-11). A small tear on
the top of the blanket indicated that it
was detached when the door closed. It
did not, however, interfere with the door
operation. Rockwell International (RI)
analysis indicated that the thermal
blankets in the Star Tracker cavity are
not necessary. RI recommended the
removal of these blankets because of the
redefined thermal environment. The
Level n Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) directed removal of the
thermal blankets from all vehicles.
A similar anomaly (IFA No. STS-33-16)
was reported on APU #1 and APU #3
bypass line "A". Temperature sensors on
the bypass line of both APUs
demonstrated erratic behavior. It is
believed that these lines experienced
vibration which led to loosening of the
temperature sensor mounts.
Temperature sensors on APU #1 bypass
lines "A" and "B" were replaced.
Replacement of APU #3 temperature
sensors was deferred until after STS-31,
when APU #3 will be replaced.
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ITEM
Section 5: STS-34 Inflight Anomalies
SRB 1 Right Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB) Holddown Post
(HDP) #2 broached and
shoe lifted from Mobile
Launch Platform (MLP)
during liftoff.




The STS-33 launch film showed the stud
at HDP #3 hung-up, similar to the
occurrence on STS-34 (IFA No. STS-33-
B-01). Broaching also occurred at HDP
#3 (IFA No. STS-33-B-02). Thread
impressions were also visible on the
forward side of the same hole. One of
the two pyrotechnic charges used on
each frangible nut did not appear to
explode properly, as indicated by ductile
separation of the frangible nut. The
potential problem experienced with
skewed firing of the frangible nut
pyrotechnic charge identified the need
for further analysis relative to the
influence and contribution of the bolt
hang-up at HDP #3 and liftoff
performance degradation. Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) and RI
analysis indicated that all 8 HDP bolts
could hang-up with no deleterious liftoff
performance effects, provided that all
frangible nuts are released.
During postflight inspection, 2 cable
connectors were found incorrectly
installed, and 2 ground straps were
found loose due to omitted washers
(IFA Nos. STS-33-K-01, STS-33-K-02,
and STS-33-K-03). The Right-Hand
(RH) forward skirt Range Safety System
Ground Support Equipment cable was
found not fully seated on its mating
connector. This cable is not used in
flight, but is used during range safety
ground checkout. The left-hand upper
strut separation ordnance connector was
found finger-loose, but correctly
lockwired. Slack in the lockwire
indicated that the connector had not
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ITEM
Section 5; STS-34 Inflight Anomalies
KSC1
(Continued)
Section 6: STS-29 Inflight Anomalies.
Orbiter 6 Water Spray Boiler (WSB)
#1 exceeded specification
leak rate.




been properly torqued prior to lockwire
installation. Two ground strap fasteners
were found bottomed out due to the
omission of washers on the RH SRB aft
Integrated Electronics Assembly bracket.
Efforts continue to ensure proper
connector/fastener installation. No
adverse conditions resulted from these
anomalies.
During on-orbit operations, the WSB for
hydraulic system #2 demonstrated
excessive Gaseous Nitrogen (GN2)
leakage (IFA No. STS-33-17). This was
similar to the GN2 leak experienced on
OV-103/STS-29. The specified leak rate
was exceeded on STS-33 by 0.06 pounds
per square inch/hour (psi/hr).
During deorbit preparations, FES "B"
was shut down because it was above
specified temperature limits (STS-33-13).
This was similar to the occurrence on
STS-29. Prior to STS-33, the midpoint
temperature sensors were repacked due
to a lag that existed between the
midpoint temperature sensor and the
actual Freon Coolant Loop
temperatures. This should have rectified
the problem. After the first occurrence
of this anomaly on STS-33, FES "B" was
recycled, which brought the temperature
into the specified limit. The STS-33
anomaly is believed to have been caused
by a tolerance build-up in the lead/lag
times of Controller "B" and its 3
temperature sensors.
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-33 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a listing of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-33. These items were reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to resolution is based on findings resulting
from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) and Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) reviews (or other special panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety
assessment arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts conducted, and
tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve each specific problem.
-
3
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SECTION 4 INDEX
INTEGRATION
1 Space Ordnance Systems NASA Standard Initiator lot test failures.
2 Potential procurement of incorrect sheet metal for Space Shuttle Program
Element subassemblies.
3 Auxiliary Power Unit fuel pump failed during fuel pump calibration at
Sundstrand.
4 Unitrode diodes alert.
5 Integrity of loctite and primer installed on External Tank and Solid Rocket
Booster threaded fasteners was suspect.
ORBITER
1 OV-103 has one Multiplexer-Demultiplexer that may contain Erie
capacitors which are prone to failure.
2 OV-104 Star Tracker Door stalled during closure.
3 Potential tire failure due to undetected delaminations after preroll.
4 Orbital Maneuvering System fuel tank weld crack in communication
screen.
5 Excessive body flap deflection during ascent.
6 Reaction Control System left helium valve "A" failed.
7 Fuel cell separator plate plating defects.
8 17" disconnect main actuator drive link bearing cracks.
9 Kernel capacitor.
10 Loose connector backshells.
11 2" Gaseous Oxygen disconnect bolt problem.
12 Safety wire on Vernier Thruster Valve found missing during vendor
inspection.
13 Display Electronics Unit #2 failure.
14 Multiplexer-Demultiplexer Flight Forward #1 failed Built-In-Test-
Equipment test.
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SECTION 4 INDEX - (Continued)
SSME
1 Nozzle tube bulge on engine #2011.
2 Main Combustion Chamber #4007 bond line leak.
3 Engine #0213 Main Combustion Chamber liner cavity diaphragm ruptured
at higher than design pressure.
4 Severity 2 SSME Controller software problem fix implemented for STS-33
(generic).
5 Engine #2027 Mam Combustion Chamber coolant outlet temperature
sensor failed high on STS-34.
6 - Uralite in G-15 joint on engine #2031.
7 STS-34 ME #2030 Controller, Unit Number F19, checkout anomaly.
8 Crack found on fuel preburner diffuser lip (multiple SSMEs).
9 Engine #2107 High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump start redline assessment.
10 A dent was found in feedline #2 on engine #2031.
SRB
1 Cracks found in an Auxiliary Power Unit containment housing.
2 Water entry into forward skirt on STS-34 during recovery.
3 Integrated Electronic Assembly test failures.
4 External Tank Attachment ring cover fastener on BI-036/STS-36 right-
hand assembly broke in half during installation. J
5 Hydrazine leaks in right-hand aft skirt. ^
,,1
SRM *
1 Right-hand aft center segment on STS-28 showed ply separation.
2 Insulation voids on forward dome.
3 Forward dome thin insulation Factor of Safety.
4 Fretted aft field joint segments.
5 Concern with proposal to leave the igniter heaters on after Pyro Initiator
Controller resistance tests.
6 Adhesive failure of polysulfide on STS-34 right-hand Solid Rocket Motor
nozzle.
7 Left-hand Safe and Arm device did not rotate in sufficient time to meet
requirement.
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JET
SECTION 4 INDEX - (Continued)
1 Liquid Hydrogen feedline vacuum jacketed bellows subassembly failed
preacceptance leak tests performed during fabrication.
Crew parachute pyrotechnic cable cutter bent pins.
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This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the STS-34
mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance information and
rationale are provided.
5-1 STS-33 Postflight Edition
SECTION 5 INDEX
ORBITER
1 Engine Interface Unit #3 momentary 60-kilobit data stream loss.
2 Auxiliary Power Unit #1 fault to high speed.
3 Multiplexer-Demultiplexer Flight-Critical Aft #1 Input/Output errors.
4 Auxiliary Power Unit #2 Gas Generator/Fuel Pump heater "A"
inoperative.
5 Flash Evaporator System hi-load inboard duct temperature low.
6 Auxiliary Power Unit #3 seal leak into drain bottle.
7 Right Orbital Maneuvering System engine cover heater system "B" failed
off.
8 Auxiliary Power Unit #2 fuel pump heater "B" cycling high.
9 Cryogenic Oxygen manifold #2 isolation valve did not close.
10 Right vent door #3 motor #1 operating on 2 phases.
11 External Tank/Orbiter Liquid Oxygen aft separation hole plugger failed.
12 Right-hand stop bolt was bent on centering ring of forward External Tank
attach separation assembly.
1 Right Solid Rocket Booster Holddown Post #2 broached and shoe lifted
from Mobile Launch Platform during liftoff.
2 Right Solid Rocket Booster forward segment missing Thermal Protection
System from forward section of systems tunnel cover.
SRM
1 Left Solid Rocket Motor rock actuator bracket damage.
2 Left Solid Rocket Motor factory joint weather seal forward edge unbonds.
3 Putty on right Solid Rocket Motor igniter outer gasket and left Solid
Rocket Motor igniter gasket retainer.
4 Left Solid Rocket Motor center field joint aft side unbond of K5NA
closeout.
5 Left and right Solid Rocket Motor aft dome Ethylene Propylene Diene
Monomer blisters.
KSC
1 Connectors on Solid Rocket Boosters improperly torqued and lockwired.
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This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the STS-29
mission (previous flight of OV-103). Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk
acceptance information and rationale are provided.
6-1 STS-33 Postflight Edition
SECTION 6 INDEX
INTEGRATION
Excessive vapor at Liquid Hydrogen External Tank/Orbiter umbilical area
during prelaunch and ascent.
ORBITER
1 Reaction Control System jet R1U failed off during mated coast.
2 Power Reactant Supply and Distribution cryogenic Hydrogen tank #3
pressure was high and manifold pressures were erratic.
3 Gaseous Oxygen Flow Control Valves can lock up due to contamination.
4 Payload bay door B "close" indication failure.
5 Water Spray Boiler #3 low relief valve reseat pressure.
6 Water Spray Boiler #1 exceeded specification leak rate.
7 17" Liquid Hydrogen disconnect leak.
8 Liquid Hydrogen 4" disconnect slow to close.
9 Flash Evaporator System primary controller B outlet oscillation.
10 Fuel Cell #1 water relief valve temperature overshoot.
11 Main Propulsion System Liquid Hydrogen feed manifold leak.
12 Hydraulic leak in aft compartment.
13 Thermal blankets in payload bay found to be loose and damaged.
14 Orbital Maneuvering System deck delta pressure anomaly.
SSME
1 Main Combustion Chamber aft bond line leak on engine #2031.
2 Cupwashers found rotated past stake on High Pressure Oxidizer
Turbopumps #2222 and #4501.
1 Extensive damage to Solid Rocket Booster Thrust Vector Control
components.
2 Structural crack found in the left aft skirt intermediate ring cap.
3 Debris Containment System plunger did not properly seat at Holddown
Post #8.
6-2 STS-33 Postflight Edition
SECTION 6 INDEX (Continued)
SRM
1 Left aft center factory joint had several adhesive unbonds of the Ethylene
Propylene Diene Monomer vulcanized weather seal.
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This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (EFAs) arising from the
OV-103/STS-33 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
7-1 STS-33 Postflight Edition
SECTION 7 INDEX
INTEGRATION
1 Space Shuttle Main Engine #2107 nozzle bluing.
ORBITER
1 Auxiliary Power Unit #1 lube oil output pressure was high.
2 Cabin air leak through the Waste Collection System.
3 Reaction Control System F1U pressure transducer failure.
4 Commanders' airspeed mach indicator out of specification.
5 Hydraulic Systems #1 and #2 accumulator ascent pressure locked-up low.
6 Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Oxygen tank #1 had a sticky
Check Valve.
7 Forward attach point system A and system B connectors found damaged.
8 "Y" Star Tracker door thermal blanket detached.
9 Flash Evaporator System B outlet temperature oscillation.
10 Erratic temperature indication from Auxiliary Power Unit #1 and #3
bypass line "A".
11 Hydraulic System #2 Water Spray Boiler Gaseous Nitrogen leakage was
out of specification.
1 Holddown Post anomalies.
2 Left-hand External Tank Attachment Ring Integrated Electronic Assembly
end cover and cable sooted.
Improper installation of cable connector assemblies.
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This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. Information from this section is
available upon request.
8-1 STS-33 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AFB Air Force Base
APS Aft Propulsion System
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
ARF Acceptance Refurbishment Facility
ASA Aerosurface Amplifier
ATP Acceptance Test Procedure
ATVC Ascent Thrust Vector Control
BFS Backup Flight System
BITE Built-in Test Equipment
CA California




CIL Critical Item List
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CV Check Valve
CVAS Configuration Verification Accounting System
DCS Debris Containment System
DCU Digital Computer Unit
DPI Development Flight Instrumentation
DMA Direct Memory Access
DoD Department of Defense
DOL Day of Launch
DR Discrepancy Report
EAFB Edwards Air Force Base
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
EIU Engine Interface Unit
EPDM Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer
EST Eastern Standard Time
ET External Tank
ETA External Tank Attachment
A-l STS-33 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Continued)
F Fahrenheit
FA Flight-Critical Aft
FASCO Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
FCL Freon Coolant Loop
PCS Flight Control System
FCV Flow Control Valve
FEC Field Engineering Change
FES Flash Evaporator System
FF1 Flight Forward #1
FIAR Failure Investigation Action Report
FID Failure Identification
FTV Fuel Isolation Valve
FMEA/CIL Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
FOS Factor of Safety
FP Fuel Pump
fps Feet Per Second
FRI Flow Recirculation Inhibitor
FRR Flight Readiness Review
ft Feet
GG Gas Generator
GGVM Gas Generator Valve Module




GPC General Purpose Computer





HPFTP High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
HPOTP High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump




A-2 STS-33 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Continued)
I/O Input/Output
ICHR Integrated Cargo Hazard Report
IEA Integrated Electronic Assembly
IFA Inflight Anomaly
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
in-lb Inch-Pound





JSC Johnson Space Center
Kbit Kilobit
KSC Kennedy Space Center
L-2 Launch Minus 2 Day Review
Ib Pound
LCC Launch Commit Criteria





LPFP Low-Pressure Fuel Pump
LPFTP Low-pressure Fuel Turbopump
LPOTP Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
LRU Line Replaceable Unit
LSFR Launch Site Flow Review
MCC Main Combustion Chamber
MDM Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
ME Main Engine
MECO Main Engine Cutoff
MEOP Maximum Expected Operating Pressure
MET Mission Elapsed Time
MIA Multiplexer Interface Adapter
MLP Mobile Launch Platform
MOD Mission Operations Director
MPS Main Propulsion System
A-3 STS-33 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Continued)
MRB Material Review Board
MSA-1 Marshall Sprayable Ablator No. 1
MSB Mission Safety Evaluation
msec Millisecond
Msec Microsecond
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
MTBF Mean-Time-Between Failure
N2 Nitrogen
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NBR Nitrite Butadiene Rubber
NDI Nondestructive Inspection
NPSP Net Positive Static Pressure
NSI NASA Standard Initiator
NSRS NASA Safety Reporting System
O2 Oxygen
OI Operational Instrumentation
OMI Operations and Maintenance Instruction
OMRSD Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
OMS Orbital Maneuvering System
OPF Orbiter Processing Facility
OPO Orbiter Program Office





PAR Prelaunch Assessment Review
PASS Primary Avionics Software System
PDU Power Drive Unit
PIC Pyro Initiator Controller
PLS Primary Landing Site
p.m. Post Meridiem (Afternoon)
ppm Parts Per Million
PR Problem Report
PRACA Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
PRCB Program Requirements Control Board
PRSD Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
A-4 STS-33 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Continued)
psi Pounds Per Square Inch
psi/hr Pounds Per Square Inch/Hour
psia Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
psid Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
psig Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Q Dynamic Pressure
QA Quality Assurance
QARSO Quality Assurance, Reliability, and Safety Office
QD Quick Disconnect
R Rankine
RCN Requirement Change Notice




RPSF Rotation, Processing and Surge Facility
RSRM Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
RSS Range Safety System
RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
RTLS Return to Launch Site
RTV Room Temperature Vulcanizing
S&A Safe & Arm
S/N Serial Number
scim Standard Cubic Inches Per Minute
sec Second
SOS Space Ordnance System
SR&QA Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRBTS Solid Rocket Beacon Tracking System
SRM Solid Rocket Motor
SRM&QA Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
SSC Stennis Space Center
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
SSRP System Safety Review Panel
SSV Space Shuttle Vehicle
STS Space Transportation System
SUBS Subsequent
A-5 STS-33 Postflight Edition
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS (Continued)
TAL Transatlantic Abort Landing
TPS Thermal Protection System
TVC Thrust Vector Control
U/N Unit Number
UCR Unsatisfactory Condition Report
USBI United Space Booster, Inc.
V Volt
WCS Waste Collection System
WSB Water Spray Boiler
WSTF White Sands Test Facility
A-6 STS-33 Postflight Edition
